Ely wouldn't either. The point is that 1A protects the political process, not a natural right we have to express ourselves; thus the distinction between government and social suppression of speech.
That's not the operative distinction most of us are working with, nor do I think there's much demand for an alternative theory of the case. The conventional distinction, which is more or less a distinction between positive and negative rights, is working quite nicely, sufficiently explains the motivation for the rule, and isn't in search of improvement.
I think you more or less wrote, "I don't really like the idea of Free Speech, but I've been told my whole life that it's important, so I'm looking for a way to resolve this dissonance."
The reason I'm not in search of better arguments is that I don't have any dissonance to resolve. (I realize that sounds snarky but I don't actually mean it to be flippant. That's genuinely what it looks like to me. No snark intended!)
