> 2b. If > 67% of the network refuses, transactions can be successfully censored.
Similar with PoW. For both PoW and PoS, the proper response is to socially coordinate forking out the censoring block producer majority (like with the Bitcoin UASF that was threatened over much less egregious miner misbehavior). PoS improves on PoW here in two ways:
1. Non-censoring PoS block producers can have a tiny meatspace presence compared to PoW mining operations, which makes it easier to physically evade pro-censorship forces
2. It's more effective to coordinate a direct confiscation of the censoring PoS block producers' on-chain capital investment, compared to making miners' equipment partially obsolete by coordinating an ad-hoc redesign of the PoW algorithm
With PoW, even if a majority of hashpower refuses to include a particular transaction in their mempool (and hence in blocks they mine), that transaction can be mined by some minority miner.
It's only when the majority is colluding to reorg the chain that the transaction can be censored.
> It's only when the majority is colluding to reorg the chain that the transaction can be censored.
I'm assuming (like in the last tweets of the linked thread) that pro-censorship forces who can arrange for the supermajority in PoS to censor transactions can also arrange for the majority in PoW to not build on any uncensored head of the chain, i.e. they can mandate "always reorg."
This is true also in PoS. If 90% of the validators censor a transaction, i.e. Do not include them in their blocks, the censored transactions would take 10x longer to be included but they would be included eventually.
"Socially coordinating" is how fiat works. It should only be a bootstrapping mechanism towards trustless behaviors, not the mechanism to cancel each other on-chain.
Similar with PoW. For both PoW and PoS, the proper response is to socially coordinate forking out the censoring block producer majority (like with the Bitcoin UASF that was threatened over much less egregious miner misbehavior). PoS improves on PoW here in two ways:
1. Non-censoring PoS block producers can have a tiny meatspace presence compared to PoW mining operations, which makes it easier to physically evade pro-censorship forces
2. It's more effective to coordinate a direct confiscation of the censoring PoS block producers' on-chain capital investment, compared to making miners' equipment partially obsolete by coordinating an ad-hoc redesign of the PoW algorithm
https://nitter.net/dystopiabreaker/status/156071598642414796...